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Abstract
Infrastructures are group-like objects that make their appearance in arithmetic geometry
in the study of computational problems related to number fields and function fields over finite
fields. The most prominent computational tasks of infrastructures are the computation of the
circumference of the infrastructure and the generalized discrete logarithms. Both these problems
are not known to have efficient classical algorithms for an arbitrary infrastructure. Our main
contributions are polynomial time quantum algorithms for one-dimensional infrastructures that
satisfy certain conditions. For instance, these conditions are always fulfilled for infrastructures
obtained from number fields and function fields, both of unit rank one. Since quadratic number
fields give rise to such infrastructures, this algorithm can be used to solve Pell’s equation and the
principal ideal problem. In this sense we generalize Hallgren’s quantum algorithms for quadratic
number fields, while also providing a polynomial speedup over them. Our more general approach
shows that these quantum algorithms can also be applied to infrastructures obtained from
complex cubic and totally complex quartic number fields. Our improved way of analyzing the
performance makes it possible to show that these algorithms succeed with constant probability
independent of the problem size. In contrast, the lower bound on the success probability due to
Hallgren decreases as the fourth power of the logarithm of the circumference. Our analysis also
shows that fewer qubits are required. We also contribute to the study of infrastructures, and
show how to compute efficiently within infrastructures.
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1 Introduction
One of the most important challenges in quantum computing has been the task of finding efficient
algorithms for problems that are intractable on a classical computer. Following Shor’s discovery
of a polynomial time quantum algorithm for factoring integers and solving the discrete logarithm
problem [23], the key ideas of the period finding algorithm were generalized and led to the framework
of the hidden subgroup problem (HSP) [14]. The major algorithmic success in this context is that
the abelian HSP can be solved efficiently by a quantum algorithm (while classical algorithms are
inefficient). This quantum algorithm can also be viewed as determining the structure of a hidden
lattice Λ inside Zn.
An important restriction of this quantum algorithm is that it only works for integral lattices. But,
Hallgren overcame this obstacle in the one-dimensional setting by generalizing Shor’s period finding
algorithm to the case where the period is irrational [11,13] (see also [15,19]). This enabled him to
give polynomial time quantum algorithms for computing the regulator of a quadratic number field
and solving the principal ideal problem. Schmidt and Vollmer [20,21] and Hallgren [12] presented
a polynomial time quantum algorithm for determining a hidden lattice in Rn for fixed n. They
showed that computing the unit group and solving the principal ideal problem in number fields
of fixed unit rank can be solved efficiently with this algorithm.1 In stark contrast to Zn, the
1Hallgren also showed in [12] how to compute the class group of a number field of fixed unit rank.
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success probability of the above quantum algorithms for finding a hidden lattice in Rn decreases
exponentially with the dimension, making them inefficient with respect to the dimension. Thus,
an important open problem is to determine whether there exist quantum algorithms whose success
probability decrease less rapidly with the dimension.
In this paper, we initiate the study of quantum algorithms for infrastructures. These group-like
structures are hidden beneath the number theoretic details of the above quantum algorithms. They
play an important role in the research on computational problems in global fields, i.e. number fields
and function fields over finite fields [6] (arithmetic geometry provides a unified treatment of global
fields [17]). For instance, computing the unit group and solving the principal ideal problem can both
be translated to well defined problems of infrastructures, namely, the computation of the lattice
characterizing the periodic symmetry of the infrastructure and the computation of generalized
discrete logarithms in these group-like structures. Both these computational problems associated
with the infrastructures are not known to have efficient classical algorithms.
In this paper we focus on arbitrary one-dimensional infrastructures and give polynomial time quan-
tum algorithms for computing the circumference and for computing the generalized discrete log-
arithms. One-dimensional infrastructures arise from global fields of unit rank, and include the
special case of real quadratic number fields studied by Hallgren [13] and complex cubic and quar-
tic number fields [2], thereby providing further applications. Our algorithms perform better than
the algorithms of [13] when applied to these problems. The proposed algorithms provide a super
polynomial speedup over classical algorithms. In addition, we make several other contributions.
Firstly, although our algorithms are given in a more general setting, they have lower complexity
and a higher success probability than those in [11,13]. In fact, all our algorithms can be shown to
have a success probability that is lower bounded by a constant, which is independent of the problem
size. For instance, our analysis shows that the success probability of computing the circumference
is a constant and at least 10−5, in contrast to [13] which implies a lower bound less than 10−9 and
decreases as a fourth power of the circumference. It is also better than the result of [19] which is
lower bounded by 2−26. Secondly, our results when specialized to quadratic number fields provide
a simpler treatment of the computational problems, and can be easily applied without extensive
knowledge of number theory. Thirdly, we introduce an interesting technical result that could have
wider applicability in the analysis of quantum algorithms employing quantum Fourier transform.
Finally, we make a contribution to the study of one-dimensional infrastructures by showing how
to perform finite precision computations efficiently within the infrastructures. These are useful
even in the context of purely classical algorithms for infrastructures. A natural direction for fur-
ther investigation is the generalization of the proposed quantum algorithms for higher dimensional
infrastructures. These are presented in [10].
This paper is structured as follows. We first introduce the mathematical preliminaries, defining
precisely the notion of an infrastructure and the computational problems associated with them. We
then show that these infrastructures can be endowed with a group structure and review the relevant
results related to the embedding of the infrastructures into circle groups. We then introduce group
homomorphisms that are key to solving the computational problems associated to them. We also
show that these homomorphisms can be computed efficiently. These results should be of interest
beyond the present context.
In section 3, we generalize the notion of periodic quantum states and prove a key technical result
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related to the analysis of Fourier sampling. This result simplifies the analysis of the algorithms and
leads to a tighter bound on the success probabilities of the proposed algorithms. In this section,
we give a quantum algorithm for estimating the period of a pseudo-periodic quantum state. This
result could be applicable to situations beyond the current setting of infrastructures.
In section 4, we show how to set up periodic quantum states from infrastructures and use the quan-
tum algorithm proposed in section 3 to estimate the circumference of the infrastructure. In section 5,
we present the quantum algorithm to solve the generalized discrete logarithm problem.
2 Infrastructures
We define infrastructures and state the two main computational problems associated to infrastruc-
tures. We restrict our attention to the one-dimensional infrastructures.
2.1 Definition of infrastructures
We refer the reader to [5, 6, 8] for more information on infrastructures. Our presentation follows
[5, 7].
Definition 1 (Infrastructure). An infrastructure of circumference R is a pair (X, d) where X is a
finite set and d : X →֒ R/RZ an injective function on X.
Injectivity of d ensures that no two distinct elements of X have the same distance. We define a
function on the set X called the baby-step, bs : X → X as follows. Consider the following set
Sx = {r ∈ R | r > 0 and d(x) + r mod R ∈ d(X)}. (1)
Let fx = minSx. Then bs(x) = x
′ such that d(x′) = d(x) + fx mod R. We also define the relative
distance function
∆bs : X → R where ∆bs(x) = fx = minSx. (2)
Informally, the bs(x) gives the element next to x. The circumference of the infrastructure, denoted
R, can be expressed in terms of this relative distance function as follows:
R =
m−1∑
i=0
∆bs(xi). (3)
It is clear that bs−1, the inverse of bs, is well-defined. Further, a group-like structure is imposed
on the set X by means of a binary operator, called the giant-step. Consider the set
Sx,y = {r ∈ R | r ≥ 0 and d(x) + d(y) + r mod R ∈ d(X)}.
Let fx,y = minSx,y. Then gs : X ×X → X is defined as:
gs(x, y) = z such that d(z) = d(x) + d(y) + fx,y mod R. (4)
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We define the relative distance function ∆gs as:
∆gs : X ×X → R where ∆gs(x, y) = fx,y = minSx,y. (5)
The giant-step is commutative, but not associative. It is “almost associative” in the sense that
for two arbitrary elements x, y ∈ X the giant-step gives an element z ∈ X whose distance satisfies
d(z) ≈ d(x) + d(y).
In infrastructures arising out of quadratic number fields the elements of the infrastructure corre-
spond to the principal reduced ideals of the number field. The distance function is the norm of the
ideals. One can cycle through these ideals using the so-called reduction operator [15]; this function
corresponds to the baby-step. One can also define the product of ideals which after reduction
corresponds to the giant-step, see [15].
The definitions of bs and gs and the relative distance functions ∆bs and ∆gs may suggest that
we need R and the distance function d to be able to compute them. However, this is not the
case. These functions can be computed efficiently without the knowledge of R or the distance
function d. To illustrate this point, let us explain how (discrete) infrastructures can be considered
as generalizations of finite cyclic groups.
Definition 2 (Discrete infrastructure). An infrastructure is said to be discrete if its circumference
R is a positive integer and its distance function d is integer-valued, i.e., d : X →֒ Z/RZ.
Example 1 (Finite cyclic group). Suppose G = 〈g〉 is a finite cyclic group of order R and generated
by g. Then we can form an infrastructure out of G as follows. We let X = G and define d(h) =
logg h, for any h ∈ G, since every element h ∈ G is of the form gd(h) for some d(h) ∈ Z. The baby
step bs of the infrastructure corresponds simply to multiplication of elements x by the generator g,
while the giant step gs corresponds to the multiplication of two elements x and y in G. The relative
distance functions ∆bs and ∆gs are constant and take on the values 1 and 0, respectively.
We can now interpret the order of G as the circumference of the infrastructure. The distance
function d(x) corresponds to the discrete logarithm of the element x with respect to the base
g. This example makes it clear why we cannot necessarily determine the circumference and the
distance function efficiently, even though we can efficiently evaluate the baby and giant steps and
their corresponding distance functions.
2.2 Computational problems
The main computational problems related to infrastructures are the computation of the circumfer-
ence and the computation of generalized discrete logarithms.
We consider only infrastructures that satisfy the assumptions below. These are necessary to be
able to carry out basic arithmetic operations in infrastructures in polynomial time. The cost is
measured with respect to the input problem size n.
A1) The circumference satisfies R ≤ 2poly(n).
A2) Any element x ∈ X can be represented by a bit string of length poly(n).
A3) The elements bs(x), bs−1(x), gs(x, y) can be determined in time poly(n) for all x, y ∈ X.
5
A4) The relative distances ∆bs(x) and ∆gs(x, y) cannot necessarily be computed exactly. We only
obtain approximate values ∆˜bs(x) and ∆˜bs(x, y) with
|∆bs(x)− ∆˜bs(x)| < 1
2m
and |∆gs(x, y)− ∆˜gs(x, y)| < 1
2m
(6)
in time2 poly(n,m).
A5) The minimum distance dmin between any two elements of the infrastructure is bounded from
below by
dmin = min
x∈X
{∆bs(x)} ≥ 1
2poly(n)
. (7)
A6) The maximum distance dmax between any two elements of the infrastructure is bounded from
above by
dmax = max
x∈X
{∆bs(x)} ≤ poly(n). (8)
A7) There exists a positive integer k¯ ≤ poly(n) and a positive (rational) number dk¯ ≥ poly(n)
such that for all x ∈ X we have
k¯−1∑
i=0
∆bs(bs
i(x)) ≥ dk¯ , (9)
where bsi denotes the i-fold application of bs. In words, any k¯ consecutive elements span a
distance of a least dk¯.
We emphasize that these assumptions are not restrictive; in fact, they are routinely made in the
work on infrastructures. We have spelt them out explicitly for expository reasons. In particular,
infrastructures arising from quadratic number fields satisfy all the assumptions made above; further
justification for these assumptions for number fields is provided below. The first three assumptions
are obvious. The relative distances ∆bs and ∆gs could be arbitrary real numbers and, thus, we
cannot always obtain the exact values. Assumption A4 is made because we cannot perform arith-
metic with arbitrary real numbers. Assumptions A5 – A7 ensure that we can compute in certain
circle groups associated to infrastructures and evaluate certain homomorphisms into these groups
efficiently in time poly(n).
The computational problems in infrastructures are :
• Computation of the circumference:
determine an m-bit approximation of the circumference R
• Generalized discrete logarithm problem:
given an element y ∈ X, determine an m-bit approximation of d(y)
The main contributions of this work are efficient quantum algorithms for infrastructures satisfying
assumptions A1 – A7. These algorithms make it possible to determine ⌊R⌉ and ⌊d(y)⌉ in time
poly(n), where the notation ⌊r⌉ means either the floor or ceiling of the real number r. Simple
2Note that m here and elsewhere in the rest of paper is not related to the number of elements in the infrastructure.
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classical post processing allows us to obtain efficiently m-bit approximations from these integral
approximations. For the sake of completeness, we prove later how this can be accomplished.
We now justify the validity of the above assumptions in the case of infrastructures from number
fields of unit rank 1 (such number fields give rise to one-dimensional infrastructures).
A1) This is shown in [18] (see also [1]).
A2) This is shown in [24, Corollary 3.7].
A3) In [2], it is shown that the baby steps and giant steps can be computed in O(Dǫ) for arbitrary
ǫ > 0 (where D is the absolute value of the discriminate, which is bounded by 2poly(n)).
However, if one traces through their references and updates the analysis of the running time,
one finds that everything is polynomial in log(D) and not just subexponential [9].
A4) This assumption is valid since one can approximate logarithms of absolute values of elements
in number fields whose size is polynomially bounded in n.
A5) In [22, Example 9.4], it is shown that dmin can be of size 1/2
poly(n). In [9], Fontein informed
us that A5 holds in general.
A6) This is shown in [2, Proposition 2.7 (i)].
A7) This is shown in [2, Proposition 2.7 (ii)].
The infrastructures from function fields are always discrete. This means that there are no issues
with finite precision. Therefore, the above computational problems can be solved directly with the
standard hidden subgroup approach. This is because the circle groups corresponding to discrete
infrastructures are just finite cyclic groups. In [9], Fontein informed us that the relevant assumptions
also hold in infrastructures from finite fields.
2.3 Circle groups from infrastructures
We now show that infrastructures naturally give rise to circle groups that are isomorphic to R/RZ.
This isomorphism is the key to solving the two computational problems in quantum polynomial
time. Here and in the next two subsections, we assume that we can compute ∆bs and ∆gs ex-
actly.
Picture the elements of X to be embedded in a circle of circumference R as follows. They are placed
along the circle starting with x0 at the topmost point of the circle and then moving clockwise. Their
position is determined by the distance function d. For instance, the element xi is associated to the
point d(xi) on the circle as depicted in figure 1.
This embedding alone does not yet give rise to a valid group structure because d(xi) + d(xj) is
not necessarily an element of d(X). To obtain a group, we start with the set X × R and the map
ψ : X × R → R/RZ defined by
ψ(x, f) = d(x) + f (10)
for all (x, f) ∈ X ×R. We call this the absolute distance of the pair (x, f).
For each d ∈ R/RZ, there exist infinitely many pairs (x, f) ∈ X × R with ψ(x, f) = d. To
avoid this infinitude, we continue by defining the equivalence relation ≡ on X × R: two pairs
(x, f), (y, g) ∈ X × R are said to be equivalent if and only if ψ(x, f) = ψ(y, g) (which is the same
as d(x) + f ≡ d(y) + g mod R). We denote the equivalence class of (x, f) by [x, f ].
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x0 x1
xi
Figure 1: Embedding an infrastructure into R/RZ
Now the set X × R/ ≡ can be endowed with a group structure as follows.
Proposition 1. The absolute distance map ψ in equation (10) is a group isomorphism from G :=
X × R/ ≡ to R/RZ, where the (commutative) group operation on G is defined by
[x, f ] + [y, g] := [gs(x, y), f + g −∆gs(x, y)] (11)
for arbitrary pairs (x, f), (y, g) ∈ X × R.
Proof. The proof is straightforward. We just verify that ψ is a group homomorphism. Letting
ψ(x, f) = d(x) + f and ψ(y, g) = d(y) + g, we obtain ψ(gs(x, y), f + g −∆gs(x, y)) = d(gs(x, y)) +
f+g−∆gs(x, y). By the definition of the giant-step it holds that d(gs(x, y)) = d(x)+d(y)+∆gs(x, y).
Thus, d(gs(x, y)) + f + g −∆gs(x, y) = d(x) + d(y) + f + g = ψ(x, f) + ψ(y, g).
2.4 Group arithmetic based on f-representations
We have to use “nice” representatives for the equivalence classes of G to be able to compute within
this group efficiently. To this end, we introduce f -representations. Intuitively, the f -representations
fill in the missing points in the circle R/RZ, i.e., the set of points (R/RZ) \ d(X).
Definition 3 (f -representation). Let (X, d) be an infrastructure. A pair (x, f) ∈ X ×R is said to
be an f -representation if 0 ≤ f < ∆bs(x). We denote the set of all f -representations by Rep(I).
The following lemma was shown in [5] (see Proposition 2 and Corollary 1 therein) in a slightly
less general setting. We include this lemma for completeness. An important aspect of this lemma
is that the group operation can be realized without having any knowledge of R or the distance
function d (except for the knowledge that is is revealed indirectly through the particular interplay
of functions bs, gs, ∆bs, and ∆gs).
We mention that for arbitrary infrastructures, neither this lemma nor any simple method make it
possible to compute inverses in G. However, in the case of infrastructures in global fields there is an
efficient classical way to compute (approximate) f -representations of inverses in the corresponding
circle groups.
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Lemma 2. The group operation in G can be efficiently realized by using f -representations to encode
the equivalence classes. More precisely, it takes at most k¯⌈2dmax/dk¯⌉ = poly(n) invocations of baby
steps to obtain the f -representation corresponding to the sum of two elements of G.
Proof. Let (x, f), (x′, f ′) ∈ Rep(I). Then, we have
[x, f ] + [x′, f ′] = [gs(x, x′), f + f ′ −∆gs(x, x′)] .
In general, the pair (x′′, f ′′) := (gs(x, x′), f+f ′−∆gs(x, x′)) ∈ X×R is not a valid f -representation.
The task now is to find the f -representation that encodes the same equivalence class in G as (x′′, f ′′).
We use the bounds −dmax ≤ f ′′ = f+f ′−∆gs(x, x′) ≤ f+f ′ ≤ 2dmax, where dmax is the maximum
distance between two consecutive elements of the infrastructure.
If f ′′ ≤ 0, then we iteratively replace (x′′, f ′′) with (bs−1(x′′), f ′′ + ∆bs(x′′)) until it just becomes
positive. If f ′′ ≥ 0, then we iteratively replace (x′′, f ′′) with (bs(x′′), f ′′−∆bs(x′′)) until it is minimal
while being nonnegative. Observe that this reduction process preserves the absolute distance.
Moreover, it takes at most k¯⌈2dmax/dk¯⌉ = poly(n) steps to obtain to the canonical representative
in Rep(I).
From now on, we identify G with Rep(I) and use (x, f) ∈ Rep(I) to denote the group elements
instead of [x, f ] to simplify notation.
The corollary below is a simple consequence of the above lemma. We state it explicitly because
this result it is extensively used in the quantum algorithms.
Corollary 3 (Double & multiply). Let (x, f) ∈ G be an arbitrary group element and a ∈ Z an
arbitrary nonnegative integer. Then, it takes at most O(k¯⌈2dmax/dk¯⌉ log(a)) = poly(n) log(a) invo-
cations of baby steps and at most O(log(a)) invocations of giant steps to obtain the f -representation
corresponding to a · (x, f).
Proof. The action of Z on the commutative group G is defined by
a · (x, f) := (x, f) + (x, f) + · · ·+ (x, f)︸ ︷︷ ︸
a times
.
Consider the special case of computing a · (x, f) for a = 2i with some i. This takes at most O(i)
steps:
(x, f) = (x(0), f (0))
2(x, f) = (x(0), f (0)) + (x(0), f (0)) =
(
gs(x(0), x(0)), 2f (0) −∆gs(x(0), x(0))
)
=: (x(1), f (1))
...
2i(x, f) = (x(i−1), f (i−1)) + (x(i−1), f (i−1))
=
(
gs(x(i−1), x(i−1)), 2f (i−1) −∆gs(x(i−1), x(i−1))
)
(12)
=: (x(i), f (i)) .
In each step, we apply the above lemma to ensure that (x(i), f (i)) are valid f -representations.
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Now suppose a = bi2
i + bi−12
i−1 + · · · + b020 in binary representation. Then, a · (x, f) can be
computed as
a · (x, f) =
i∑
j=0
bj · (x(j), f (j)) .
with at most i additions. We again use the above lemma to ensure that the partial sums are valid
f -representations.
In total, the whole process takes at most O(log(a)) giant-steps and O(k¯⌈2dmax/dk¯⌉ log(a)) baby-
steps.
2.5 Group homomorphisms from R and Z× R into circle groups
In this subsection, we continue to assume that we can determine the functions ∆bs and ∆gs exactly,
and compute with arbitrary real numbers. In the next subsection, we will relax this assump-
tion.
Definition 4. Let h : R → G be the surjective group homomorphism, where h(r) is defined to be
the unique f -representation (x, f) ∈ Rep(I) with (x0, r) ≡ (x, f).
Recall that we define the distance function d such that d(x0) = 0, thus (x0, 0) is the identity of
G.
The statement of following lemma is obvious. We formulate it explicitly since it provides the
intuition required to understand the quantum algorithm for computing the circumference.
Lemma 4. The kernel of h is equal to RZ. Thus, h is a periodic function on R with period R.
Lemma 5. Let r ∈ [0, B] ⊂ R, where B is an arbitrary (but fixed) positive real number. Then,
we can determine the exact value h(r) using O(log(B)) giant-steps and O(log(B)k¯⌈2dmax/dk¯⌉) =
O(log(B)poly(n)) baby-steps under the assumption that ∆bs and ∆gs can be computed exactly.
Proof. In general, (x0, r) is not a valid f -representation. Thus, we need to find the corresponding
f -representation. If r is small and positive, then we can use baby-steps to find it with at most
k¯⌈r/dk¯⌉ invocations.
If r is large, then the baby-step method is not efficient anymore. We have to use giant-steps as
well. The idea is to use the double and multiply technique of Corollary 3. Let xk¯ = bs
k¯(x0).
Then d(xk¯) ≥ dk¯. Let a = [r/d(xk¯)], where [x] denotes the nearest integer to x. We can compute
a · (xk¯, 0) = (x, f) using O(log(a)) = O(log(B)) giant-steps and O(log(B)k¯⌈2dmax/dk¯⌉) baby-steps.
Note that (x, f) ≡ (x0, ad(xk¯)). But, |ad(xk¯) − r| = |[r/d(xk¯)]d(xk¯) − r| ≤ d(xk¯)/2. Therefore,
(x, f) is at most within a distance of d(xk¯)/2 from r. Thus we can find h(r) by using no more
than k¯ additional invocations of either bs or bs−1. The overall time complexity of evaluating
h(r) is therefore O(log(B)k¯⌈2dmax/dk¯⌉) = O(log(B)poly(n)), since dmax and k¯ are O(poly(n) by
assumptions A6 and A7.
Similar ideas can be applied when r is negative. The method proposed in Lemma 5 relies essentially
on the group arithmetic of G and thus is quite different from a generalization of the binary search
method.
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Definition 5. Let x ∈ X be an arbitrary (but fixed) element of the infrastructure. Let g : Z ×
R → G be the surjective homomorphism, where g(a, r) is defined to be the unique f -representation
corresponding to
a · (x, 0) + h(r) . (13)
We note that g(a, b) is same as the f -representation of h(ad(x) + b), where d(x) is the distance of
x.
The following statement on the kernel of the homomorphism g is obvious.
Lemma 6. The kernel of the above homomorphism g is equal to
{(a, r) : r ≡ −a d(x) mod R} .
Corollary 7. Let A be an arbitrary positive integer and B an arbitrary positive real number.
Then, we can determine the exact value g(a, b) for all pairs (a, r) ∈ {0, 1, . . . , A − 1} × [0, B] in
time O((logA+ logB)poly(n)) under the assumption that ∆bs and ∆gs can be computed perfectly.
Proof. By definition g(a, r) = a · (x, 0) + h(r). The computation of a · (x, 0) can be performed in
O(log(A)k¯⌈2dmax/dk¯⌉) = O(log(A)poly(n)) time by Corollary 3, while the computation of h(r) can
be performed in O(log(B)k¯⌈2dmax/dk¯⌉) = O(log(B)poly(n)) time by Lemma 5. The final group
addition in G takes at most k¯ = poly(n) baby-steps, by Lemma 2.
2.6 Efficient approximate group arithmetic and evaluation of the homomor-
phisms from R and Z× R
The previous assumption that we can compute ∆bs and ∆gs and represent arbitrary real numbers
is clearly an idealization. We made this assumption at first because we can explain the intuition in
a simpler and more elegant way when the homomorphisms h and g are perfect. We now drop this
assumption and work instead with the approximate versions ∆˜bs and ∆˜gs.
Let L be some large positive integer. We only consider evaluation points r that are rational numbers
with denominator L.
Let h(r) = (x, f) be the perfect f -representation with (x, f) ≡ (x0, r). We can only determine an
approximate h˜(r) = (x˜, f˜) ∈ X ×R of h(r). This approximation can be realized efficiently and has
the following two properties:
P1. The first component is off at most by either a baby-step backward or forward, i.e., x˜ ∈
{bs−1(x), x,bs(x)}.
P2. If we have the promise that
1
L
≤ f ≤ ∆bs(x)− 1
L
(14)
holds, then the first component is correct, i.e., x˜ = x, and the second component f˜ satisfies
|f − f˜ | ≤ 1
2L
. (15)
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Later, we will show that all evaluation points r necessary for the quantum algorithm are such
that the condition in equation (14) holds with high probability by adding a random shift to the
evaluation points.
Lemma 8 (Approximate homomorphism h˜). Let L be a positive integer with dmin > 1/L. We
consider only evaluation points of the form r = k/L with r < B. Let h(r) = (x, f) be the perfect
f -representation. Then, we can compute an approximate pair h˜(r) = (x˜, f˜) that satisfies P1, P2.
The running time is poly(log(B), log(L), n).
Proof. We analyze what happens if we run the algorithm in Lemma 5, but now rely on the ap-
proximate versions ∆˜bs and ∆˜gs. Recall that the parameter m characterizes the precision of the
approximations. The maximal deviation between the approximate and perfect values is smaller
than 1/2m.
We use d˜acc(·) to denote the corresponding approximate accumulated distances of the (intermediate)
f -representations and their first components. We use dacc(·) to denote the correct accumulated
distance of the representations and elements (these distances exist even though we cannot always
compute them). The accumulated distances are not taken modulo R and take into account how
the f -representation is generated. A key observation that we need in the proof is that dacc(x˜, f˜) =
dacc(x˜) + f˜ and d˜acc(x˜, f˜) = d˜acc(x˜) + f˜ , so that dacc(x˜, f˜)− d˜acc(x˜, f˜) = dacc(x˜)− d˜acc(x˜).
The characterizing condition of the perfect f -representation is
dacc(x) ≤ r < dacc(x) + ∆bs(x) . (16)
We can only guarantee
d˜acc(x˜) ≤ r < d˜acc(x˜) + ∆˜bs(x˜) (17)
for the approximate pair (x˜, f˜).
Assume that m has been chosen to be sufficiently large so that
|d˜acc(x˜)− dacc(x˜)| ≤ 1
2L
(18)
holds. Together with equation (17) this implies
dacc(x˜)− 1
2L
≤ r < dacc(x˜) + ∆bs(x˜) + 1
2L
+
1
2m
. (19)
This condition on x˜ is weaker than the condition of the perfect x in equation (16). But since
1/2m < 1/L < dmin we must have x˜ ∈ {bs−1(x), x,bs (x)}, depending on which of the three cases
r < dacc(x˜), dacc(x˜) ≤ r < d˜acc(x˜) + ∆bs(x˜), or d˜acc(x˜) + ∆bs(x˜) ≤ r occurs. We cannot have a
deviation by more than one baby-step backward or forward because otherwise equation (17) would
not be satisfied.
If we know that f satisfies 1L ≤ f ≤ ∆bs(x)− 1L , then we can conclude that x˜ = x must hold. This
is because the first and third cases are excluded. The condition on f˜ is automatically satisfied in
this case since f˜ = r − d˜acc(x˜), which is the same as r − d˜acc(x).
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We now show how to choose m so that the condition in equation (17) holds. The algorithm in
Lemma 5 has two steps. In the first step, we compute a · (xk¯, 0), where a = [r/d(xk¯)]. This gives
us a representation (x′, f ′), such that
|dacc(x′, f ′)− r| ≤ d(xk¯)
2
.
Then we apply a sequence of baby-steps to obtain an f -representation (x, f), which satisfies
dacc(x, f) = r.
Working with ∆˜bs and ∆˜gs, in the first step we actually compute (x˜
′, f˜ ′) an approximation of
a˜ · (xk¯, 0), where a˜ = [r/d˜(xk¯)].
Let us analyze the error in this computation. The computation of a˜ · (xk¯, 0) itself can be broken
down into two parts: (i) computation of representations of the form (x˜(i), f˜ (i)) which approximate
2i(xk¯, 0) and (ii) summing O(log a˜) such representations.
The error at the very beginning e0 satisfies
e0 := |d˜acc(x˜(0))− dacc(x˜(0))| = |d˜acc(x˜(0), f˜ (0))− dacc(x˜(0), f˜ (0))| < k¯
2m
.
Note that d˜acc(x˜
(0)) ≥ dk¯ holds because if we get a value strictly smaller than dk¯ we can replace it
by dk¯, because of A7. The error in the ith step
ei := |d˜acc(x˜(i))− dacc(x˜(i))| = |d˜acc(x˜(i), f˜ (i))− dacc(x˜(i), f˜ (i))|
satisfies the recursion
ei < 2ei−1 +
1
2m
+
k¯
2m
⌈
2dmax
dk¯
⌉
(20)
The recursion relation can be easily explained by considering equation (12). The first term is due
to the fact that the error in f˜ (i−1) is multiplied by 2, the second term is due to one giant-step, and
the third term due to O(k¯⌈2dmax/dk¯⌉) baby-steps used to obtain a valid f -representation. This
implies
ei <
1
2m−i
(
k¯ + 1 + k¯
⌈
2dmax
dk¯
⌉)
. (21)
In order to obtain (x˜′, f˜ ′), we have to sum O(log a˜) such f -representations, where i varies from 0
to log a˜− 1. Each sum adds an additional error term due to the giant step and the baby-steps used
for reduction. Therefore the error at the end of the first step is given by
e′ := |d˜acc(x˜′)− dacc(x˜′)| = |d˜acc(x˜′, f˜ ′)− dacc(x˜′, f˜ ′)|
=
a˜
2m
(
k¯ + 1 + k¯
⌈
2dmax
dk¯
⌉)
+
log a˜
2m
(
1 + k¯
⌈
2dmax
dk¯
⌉)
,
≤ r + dk¯
2mdk¯
(
k¯ + 1 + k¯
⌈
2dmax
dk¯
⌉)
+
log(r/dk¯ + 1)
2m
(
1 + k¯
⌈
2dmax
dk¯
⌉)
where we used the fact that a˜ ≤ r/dk¯ + 1. The f -representation (x′, f ′) is at most at a distance3
of dmaxk¯ from r. Thus (x˜
′, f˜ ′) is at most a distance of (e′ + dmaxk¯) from r and we need to take at
most k¯
⌈
(e′ + dmaxk¯)/dk¯
⌉
baby-steps to obtain (x˜, f˜).
3We can tighten this by a factor of 2. But this suffices.
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The error in the accumulated distances of the final representation (x˜, f˜) is given by
e˜ := |d˜acc(x˜)− dacc(x˜)| = |d˜acc(x˜, f˜)− dacc(x˜, f˜)|
= e′ +
k¯
2m
⌈
e′ + dmaxk¯
dk¯
⌉
The dominant term in the error is the first term e′, as it is proportional to r, while the second term
is proportional to r/2m and therefore does not contribute too much as m is large. We can make
the error smaller than 1/2L as required in equation (18) by choosing m = poly(log(B), log(L)).
The proof does not actually require that the evaluation points are of the form k/L.
Analogous results hold for the homomorphism g. We state them without proof since the above
argument can be easily adapted.
Let g(a, r) = (x, f) be the perfect f -representation with (x, f) ≡ (x0, r). We can only determine
an approximate g˜(a, r) = (x˜, f˜) ∈ X × R of g(a, r). This approximation can be realized efficiently
and has the properties P1, P2.
Lemma 9 (Approximate homomorphism g˜). Let L be a positive integer with dmin > 1/L. We
consider only evaluation points of the form (a, r) with a ∈ {0, 1, . . . , A − 1} and r = k/L ∈ [0, B].
Let g(a, r) = (x, f) be the perfect f -representation. Then, we can compute an approximate pair
g˜(a, r) = (x˜, f˜) that satisfies P1, and P2. The running time is poly(log(A), log(B), log(L), n).
3 Quantum algorithm for approximating the period of pseudo pe-
riodic states
In this section we generalize the notion of periodic states introduced in [16]. We assume that the
quantum states are elements of a q-dimensional complex Hilbert space, denoted by Cq.
3.1 Pseudo-periodic states
Definition 6 (Periodic state). A quantum state in Cq is periodic with period r ∈ Z at offset
k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , r − 1} if it is of the form
|ψ〉k,r := 1√
p
p−1∑
j=0
|k + jr〉, (22)
where p = ⌊(q − k − 1)/r + 1⌋. We denote a periodic state with period r at offset k by |ψ〉k,r.
Periodic states can be created by the evaluation of injective functions over a uniform superposition.
To be more precise, we create the state |ψ〉 = q−1/2∑q−1i=0 |i〉|f(i)〉, and measure the second register.
We assume that f is periodic with period r. It is possible to recover the period r by means of
Fourier sampling. In fact, the period can be recovered even when r is irrational. For this reason,
we generalize these periodic states to a larger class of quantum states called the pseudo-periodic
states.
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Definition 7 (Pseudo-periodic state). A pseudo-periodic state in Cq, with possibly irrational period
r ∈ R, is of the form:
|ψ〉k,r = 1√
p
p−1∑
j=0
|⌊k + jr⌉〉, (23)
where k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , ⌊r⌋} and p is the largest integer such that ⌊k + (p− 1)r⌉ ≤ (q − 1).
Please note that ⌊x⌉ can be either ⌊x⌋ or ⌈x⌉, therefore, p take any integer value in the set
{⌊(q − 2)/r⌋, . . . , ⌊q/r⌋ + 1}, depending on the value of the offset k. If we assume that r > 2,
then we can restrict p ∈ {⌊q/r⌋ − 1, ⌊q/r⌋, ⌊q/r⌋+ 1}.
The weakly periodic functions defined in [13] are one class of functions which can induce such
pseudo-periodic states. As we show in this section, we can recover the period even when the state
is “almost” periodic. We observe that in the definition of the periodic states above, there is an
implicit dependence on the offset k; this offset is usually the outcome of some measurement, and
therefore random.
3.2 Perturbed geometric sums with missing terms
The following lemma is at the heart of the analysis of the quantum algorithms for infrastructures. It
is crucial for understanding the performance of these algorithms. The special case J = {0, 1, . . . , n−
1} suffices to bound the probability of the algorithm for computing the circumference. The more
general case where J is a proper subset of {0, 1, . . . , n − 1} is necessary for the analysis of the
quantum algorithm for computing the discrete logarithms.
Lemma 10 (Perturbed geometric sums with missing terms). Let ω be the nth root of unity e2πi/n,
n ≥ 2, θ an arbitrary real-valued function defined on J ⊆ {0, . . . , n − 1} satisfying the following
conditions on θj and |J |:
|θj | ≤ n/32 (24a)
|J | ≥ n(1− cδ)/(1 − 2 sin(π/32)) (24b)
where
cδ = sinc(δ) =
sin(πδ)
πδ
if |δ| < 1. (25)
Then the following inequality holds:
1
|J |2
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j∈J
ωδj+θj
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
≥
(
1− 2 sin(π/32) − (1− cδ) n|J |
)2
. (26)
Proof. Triangle inequality and upper bound on the absolute value of the unperturbed geometric
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sum without missing terms imply∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j∈J
ωδj
∣∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j∈J¯
ωδj
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j∈J
ωδj +
∑
j∈J¯
ωδj
∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣
n−1∑
j=0
ωδj
∣∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣1− ωδn1− ωδ
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣ sin(πδ)sin(πδ/n)
∣∣∣∣ (27)
≥
∣∣∣∣sin(πδ)πδ/n
∣∣∣∣ = ncδ, (28)
The equality in equation (27) follows from |1 − eiϑ| = |e−iϑ/2 − eiϑ/2| = 2| sin(ϑ/2)| holding for all
ϑ ∈ R. For the inequality in equation (28) we used the fact that | sinϑ| ≤ |ϑ|, when |ϑ| < π/2.
Subtracting the absolute value of the sum over J¯ from both sides of equation (28) and dividing by
|J | yields
1
|J |
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j∈J
ωδj
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ cδ n|J | − 1|J |
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j∈J¯
ωδj
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≥ cδ n|J | −
J¯
|J |
= 1−
(
1− cδ
) n
|J | . (29)
We now bound the “perturbed” geometric sum. To this end, we use some basic ideas from quan-
tum information theory. Define the states |ψ〉 = 1√
|J |
∑
j∈J ω
δj |j〉 and |e〉 = 1√
|J |
∑
j∈J |j〉, the
projector P = |e〉〈e|, and the diagonal unitary matrix U = diag(ωθ0 , . . . , ωθ|J |−1). Observe that
the square of the absolute value of unperturbed geometric sum is equal to ‖P |ψ〉‖2 and that of the
perturbed one to ‖PU |ψ〉‖2. We have∣∣∣‖P |ψ〉‖ − ‖PU |ψ〉‖∣∣∣ ≤ ‖P |ψ〉 − PU |ψ〉‖
≤ ‖P‖ · ‖I − U‖ · ‖|ψ〉‖
= 2max
j
{
| sin(2πθj/(2n))|
}
≤ 2 sin(π/32) . (30)
The upper bound on ‖I − U‖ follows by noting that the entries of the diagonal matrix I − U are
1 − e2πiθj/n and using the above identity for the absolute value of expressions of this form. Let
‖P |ψ〉‖ = x and ‖PU |ψ〉‖ = y. Then equation (30) implies the desired result since
y2 ≥ (x− 2 sin(π/32))2 ≥ (1− 2 sin(π/32) − (1− cδ) n|J |
)2
(31)
where we used equation (29) in the last step.
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We pause to make two observations regarding the application of this result. First, we must ensure
that |J |/n ≥ (1 − cδ)/(1 − 2 sin(π/32)) for δ ∈ [0, 1). Second, the choice of |θj| ≤ n/32, can
be improved in that we can tolerate a higher perturbation, depending on the actual value of δ.
Although, we retain this bound on θj throughout this paper for the sake of a clearer exposition,
optimizing this bound on θj based on δ will enable us to obtain better bounds on the success
probability of the quantum algorithms.
3.3 Presentation and proof of the quantum algorithm
Now we shall give a quantum algorithm for estimating the period of a pseudo-periodic state. In
general, these states arise from some periodic functions, therefore the proposed quantum algorithm
can be used to estimate the periods of such functions.
Theorem 11. Given a pair of pseudo-periodic states whose period S ∈ R is bounded as M ≥ S > 1,
then with a probability Ω(1) and in time poly(logS), Algorithm 1 gives a list of real numbers L such
that for some Sˆ ∈ L, we have |S − Sˆ| ≤ 1. Further, |L| = O(poly logS) and the success probability
is given by
psuccess ≥ 1
2
(
1
32
− 2
S
)2(
1− 2S
q
)2(
sinc
(1
2
+
1
2S
)
− 2 sin(π/32)
)4
(32)
where M2 ≤ q < 2M2.
Algorithm 1 Approximate period of pseudo-periodic states
Require: A pair of pseudo-periodic states in Cq with period S ∈ R, where M is an upper bound
on S > 2 and q is an integer such that S2 ≤M2 ≤ q < 2M2.
1: For each pseudo-periodic state, apply a Fourier transform over Zq and measure to obtain c and
d.
2: Compute the convergents ci/di of c/d where di ≤ ⌊q/32⌋.
3: Return L =
{
[ciq/c] | di ≤ ⌊q/32⌋
}
as candidates for S.
Proof. Assume that the pseudo-periodic state is as follows:
|ψ〉o,S = 1√|J |
∑
j∈J
|⌊o+ jS⌉〉 .
where J = {0, 1, . . . , p− 1} and p ∈ {⌊q/S⌋ − 1, ⌊q/S⌋, ⌊q/S⌋+ 1}. Since we are Fourier sampling,
we may assume without loss of generality, that o = 0. Therefore, the measured distribution will be
the same as the one induced by Fourier sampling the following state:
1√|J |
∑
j∈J
|⌊jS⌉〉 (33)
Taking the Fourier transform over Zq we obtain
1√|J | 1√q
∑
j∈J
q−1∑
ℓ=0
ωℓ⌊jS⌉q |ℓ〉. (34)
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The Fourier transform at |ℓ〉 has the amplitude
1√
q|J |
∑
j∈J
ω⌊jS⌉ℓq . (35)
We seek to find a lower bound on the probability of obtaining outcomes ℓ of the form [mqS ], where
m ∈ {0, 1, . . . , ⌊S⌋}. For a given m, [m qS ] denotes either the floor or ceiling so that that m qS =
[m qS ] + ǫℓ with |ǫℓ| ≤ 12 . The probability of observing ℓ is given by
1
q|J |
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j∈J
ω
p
q
⌊jS⌉[m q
S
]
p
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
. (36)
To bound this probability, we consider the exponent of ωp
p
q
⌊jS⌉[m q
S
] =
p
q
(jS + δj)(m
q
S
+ ǫℓ)
= pmj +
pSǫℓ
q
j +
pδjǫℓ
q
+
pmδj
S
= pmj +
pSǫℓ
q
j +
pδjǫℓ
q
+
pmδj
S
= pmj + δj + θj. (37)
The first term is a multiple of p, implying that it can be omitted in the exponent. The factor
δ = pSǫℓq in front of j in the second term is less or equal to (1+S/q)/2 ≤ (1+1/S)/2. The absolute
value of the sum of the third and fourth terms is less or equal to p/32 provided that m < ⌊S/32⌋.
In this case, the phase perturbations θj caused by these two terms satisfy equation (24a). Further,
|J | = p ensures that equation (24b) is also satisfied and we can apply Lemma 10. We conclude
that the probability of obtaining |ℓ〉 is
1
q|J |
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j∈J
ω
p
q
⌊jS⌉[m q
S
]
p
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
≥ p
q
(
sinc
(1
2
+
1
2S
)
− 2 sin(π/32)
)2
≥
(
1
S
− 2
q
)(
sinc
(1
2
+
1
2S
)
− 2 sin(π/32)
)2
where the last inequality follows from p ≥ ⌊q/S⌋ − 1 ≥ q/S − 2. So the probability of obtaining
any “good” ℓ, i.e. m ∈ {1, . . . , ⌊S/32 − 1⌋}, is at least β, where
β =
(
S
32
− 2
)(
1
S
− 2
q
)(
sinc
(1
2
+
1
2S
)
− 2 sin(π/32)
)2
, (38)
where we used that ⌊S/32− 1⌋ ≥ (S/32 − 2). The measured value ℓ is a multiple of q/S rounded
to the nearest integer i.e. ℓ = [mq/S] for some m.
Unlike the case of period finding algorithm where the period is integral, the period S of |ψ〉o,S
cannot be reconstructed with Fourier sampling one (pseudo-periodic) quantum state. However,
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as shown below, we can reconstruct using the method suggested by Hallgren in [13]. Suppose
we have two measurements c = [kq/S] and d = [lq/S], obtained by Fourier sampling the pair of
periodic states, then k/l occurs as a convergent of c/d and we can compute an integer close to S
by computing [kq/c]. Without loss of generality assume that 0 < k ≤ l < ⌊S/32⌋. Assume that
c = kq/S + ǫc and d = lq/S + ǫd where −1/2 ≤ ǫc, ǫd ≤ 1/2. Then∣∣∣∣ cd − kl
∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣kq + ǫcSlq + ǫdS − kl
∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣S(ǫcl − ǫdk)l2q + ǫdSl
∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣S(l + k)/2l2q − Sl/2
∣∣∣∣ ≤
∣∣∣∣ Sll2q − Sl/2
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣ 1lq/S − 1/2
∣∣∣∣ < 12l2 ,
under the assumption that 0 < k ≤ l < ⌊S/32⌋ and q ≥ S2. Thus k/l is a convergent of c/d. Since
l ≤ ⌊S/32⌋, we only need to compute the convergents ci/di whose denominators di are less than
⌊q/32⌋. We now form the list of candidate estimates for S as
L =
{
[ciq/c] | di ≤ ⌊q/32⌋
}
. (39)
As the di grow exponentially, |L| = O(polylog(|S|)).
Since k/l is a convergent of c/d, we know that there exists an estimate Sˆ = [kq/c] ∈ L. We now
show that Sˆ satisfies |S − Sˆ| ≤ 1. Let c = kq/S + ǫc and Sˆ = kq/c, where |ǫc| ≤ 1/2. Then, we can
bound |S − Sˆ| as
|S − Sˆ| =
∣∣∣∣S − S1 + ǫcS/kq
∣∣∣∣ ≤
∣∣∣∣ ǫcS2/kq1 + ǫcS/kq
∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣ ǫc/k1 + ǫc/kS
∣∣∣∣ because q ≥ S2
=
∣∣∣ǫc
k
∣∣∣ ∣∣∣∣ 11 + ǫc/kS
∣∣∣∣
≤ 1
2k
1
1− 1/2kS ≤
1
2k
· 2
≤ 1.
We now compute a lower bound on the success probability of the algorithm. We have already
seen that the probability of a pair of good measurements is given by (38). In order to be able to
recover the period S, we require k and l to be coprime. By Lemma 20, the probability that k, l
are coprime is at least 1/2. Thus the overall success probability of the algorithm is greater than
β2/2 = Ω(1).
The algorithm does not return a single value for the period but rather a small list of candidates for
the period. This presumes a post processing step by which we can single out the solutions.
Further, we note that the previous algorithm uses a pair of pseudo-periodic states and if these
states are being prepared probabilistically, then we must factor that into the success probability of
the algorithm.
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4 Quantum algorithm for approximating the circumference
Our goal is to set up pseudo-periodic states whose period is a multiple of the circumference of an
infrastructure. Then the quantum algorithm of the preceding section can be applied to extract an
integer close to the circumference. With this knowledge, the circumference can be computed to the
desired accuracy by a classical algorithm.
4.1 Pseudo-periodic states from infrastructures
In section 2.6, we showed that an approximate version h˜ of h can be computed so that propertiesP1,
P2 are satisfied. For this approximate version to be useful, it is necessary that the f -representations
at the evaluation points meet the condition stated in equation (14). In this subsection, we show how
to satisfy this condition which allows us to compute h˜ so that the first component is always correct
and the error in the second component is under control. However, h˜ does not induce the periodic
states that we discussed in the previous section. To create a periodic quantum state it is essential
to work with a “quantized” version of h˜. Therefore we introduce the function hN : Z → X × Z by
setting
hN (i) = (x˜, ⌊f˜N⌋), (40)
where h˜( iN +
j
L) = (x˜, f˜). When P2 is satisfied, it is helpful to interpret hN in the following way:
hN (i) = (x, k), then k is the number of sampling points between d(x) + ⌊(i/N + j/L)/R⌋R and
i/N + j/L.
The incorrectness in h˜ cannot be avoided if the evaluation points r are chosen arbitrarily. As already
stated in Lemma 8, we assume that the evaluation points are of the form k/L for some large integer
L and bounded k. Even so, we cannot evaluate always h˜ correctly for every k. Therefore, we further
restrict the evaluation of h˜ to a subset of the points which are 1N uniformly spaced along a bounded
interval, where N divides L. We choose N ≥ ⌈2/dmin⌉ so that there are at least two evaluation
points iN and
i+1
N between any two adjacent elements of I. This is shown in the figure below. The
dashed lines indicate the sampling points.
bs−1(x) x bs(x)
r = iN
But this is still inadequate to satisfy equation (14), as some of the evaluation points could be very
close to elements of the infrastructure. So we shift all the evaluation points by a random offset of
the form jL , where j is chosen uniformly at random from {0, 1, . . . , LN − 1}. This is shown in the
figure below. The solid lines indicate the shifted evaluation points and they are still of the form
k/L.
Now we can show that with high probability equation (14) is satisfied and can use Lemma 8 to
guarantee that h˜ can be computed with the precision stated in equation (15).
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bs−1(x) x bs(x)
r = iL +
j
L
Lemma 12. Let N ≥ ⌈2/dmin⌉. Suppose we evaluate hN at points i/N + j/L for i ∈ {0, . . . , q−1},
where j chosen uniformly at random from {0, 1, . . . , L/N − 1}, and L is an integer such that
L ≥ N
⌈
2k¯
(1− ph)
⌈
q
Ndk¯
⌉⌉
. (41)
Then with probability greater or equal to ph, no sampling point i/N + j/L is closer than 1/L to any
element x of the I, i.e.,
|(d(x) − i/N − j/L) mod R| ≥ 1/L. (42)
Proof. By assumption A7 there are at most k¯⌈q/Ndk¯⌉ elements of I in the interval [0, q/N ]. There
are L/N possible offsets to choose from. Since the offsets are spaced at 1/L, any element x ∈ I can
be within a distance of less than 1/2L for at most two offsets. The fraction of offsets that are not
useful is given by 2k¯⌈q/Ndk¯⌉/(L/N) ≤ 1− ph provided that L is chosen as in equation (41).
When L is chosen according to Lemma 12, we have hN (i) = (x, ⌊f˜N⌋), where h˜( iN + jL) = (x, f˜).
We use x instead of x˜ on purpose to emphasize again that the first component is correct. It is
crucial to observe that ⌊f˜N⌋ is equal to ⌊fN⌋. This is because P2 holds and no evaluation point
is within 1/L of any element of the infrastructure.
The preceding results imply that hN (i) can be computed efficiently and correctly.
Corollary 13. If Lemma 12 holds, then for all i with 0 ≤ i ≤ 2N2R2 the value hN (i) = (x˜, ⌊f˜N⌋)
is equal to (x, ⌊fN⌋), where h˜(i/N + j/L) = (x˜, f˜) and h(i/N + j/L) = (x, f).
Next we show that hN when evaluated over a finite interval induces a periodic state with probability
greater than or equal to 1/2, if we assume that no sampling point is too close to any element of
the infrastructure.
Lemma 14. Let N ≥ ⌈2/dmin⌉ and let |ψ〉 = q−1/2
∑q−1
i=0 |i〉|hN (i)〉. We assume that no element
of the infrastructure is too close to the sampling points i/N + j/L, where j and L are chosen as in
Lemma 12. Then, with probability greater than
pperiodic =
(
1− 1
Ndmin
− 1
NR
)(
1− 2NR
q
)
(43)
measuring the second register of |ψ〉 induces a periodic state with period NR,
|ψ〉k,NR = 1√
p
p−1∑
ℓ=0
|⌊k + ℓNR⌉〉, (44)
where p is equal to one of the values4 ⌊q/NR⌋ − 1, ⌊q/NR⌋, or ⌊q/NR⌋+ 1.
4Note that N ≥ ⌈2/dmin⌉, implies that NR > 2, and therefore, p must be at least ⌊q/NR⌋ − 1.
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Proof. Denote the measurement outcome by (x,m). First, we show that if (x,m) satisfies a cer-
tain condition, then the resulting post-measurement state is a pseudo-periodic state. Second, we
estimate the probability that we obtain such measurement outcome.
Assume that hN (k) = (x,m) for some k ∈ {0, . . . , ⌊NR⌋}. Then, in ℓth period the sampling
points are at a distance αℓ +mℓ/N for mℓ ∈ {0, 1, . . . , ⌊N bs(x)⌋} from the element x. Under the
assumption of Lemma 12, 1/L ≤ αℓ ≤ 1/N − 1/L.
Consider now the sampling points for the zeroth period and some other period ℓ 6= 0.
x bs(x)
k − 1 k k + 1
(x, 0) (x, 1) (x,m)
α0
αℓ
Then, the following cases arise: 1/L ≤ αℓ ≤ α0, and α0 < αℓ ≤ 1/N − 1/L. As can be seen
from the figure above, if 1/L ≤ αℓ ≤ α0, then we must have hN (k) = hN (k + ⌊ℓNR⌋). On the
other hand, if α0 < αℓ ≤ 1/N − 1/L, then it is clear that hN (k) = hN (k + ⌈ℓNR⌉) unless k
corresponds to the last sampling point between the elements x and y = bs(x) since in this case
hN (⌈k + ℓNR⌉) = (y, 0) 6= hN (k).
On the one hand, if k does not correspond to the last sampling point between two adjacent elements
of I, then for all ℓ ∈ {0, 1, . . . , p − 1} we have hN (k + ⌊ℓNR⌉) = hN (k). On the other hand, if k
corresponds to the last evaluation point between two elements, then the preimage may not contain
all ℓ.
We now estimate the probability of obtaining an outcome (x,m) such that hN (k) = (x,m) and
the offset k ∈ {0, . . . , ⌊NR⌋} does not correspond to the last evaluation point between any two
elements.
There are ⌊NR⌋+1 possible offsets in the zeroth period. At most ⌈R/dmin⌉ of these can correspond
to last evaluation points between two elements. We know that the preimage of a “good” measure-
ment outcome (x,m) contains at least ⌊q/NR⌋ − 1 elements. So, the probability of obtaining a
good measurement outcome is at least
pperiodic =
(⌊NR⌋+ 1− ⌈R/dmin⌉) · (⌊q/NR⌋ − 1)
q
≥ (NR−R/dmin − 1)(q/NR − 2)/q
=
(
1− 1
Ndmin
− 1
NR
)(
1− 2NR
q
)
.
4.2 Presentation and proof of the quantum algorithm
Theorem 15 (Estimating the circumference to arbitrary accuracy). Let I be an infrastructure
satisfying the assumptions A1–A7. For any δ > 0, there is an efficient Las Vegas algorithm that
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outputs an estimate Rˆ of the circumference R of I such that |R− Rˆ| ≤ δ.
Let N ≥ ⌈2/dmin⌉, S = NR, ph the probability of evaluating hN correctly, and pperiodic the probability
of creating a periodic state, see equation (43). Then, the classical algorithm invokes Algorithm 1
an expected O(1/qsuccess) number of times, where qsuccess is
qsuccess ≥
p2hp
2
periodic
2
(
1
32
− 2
S
)2(
1− 2S
q
)2(
sinc
(1
2
+
1
2S
)
− 2 sin(π/32)
)4
. (45)
The classical computations take poly(log(R), log(1/δ)) time.
Proof. We first create an pseudo-periodic state in Cq, where q is chosen as specified by Algorithm 1.
We create the superposition
|ψ〉 = 1√
q
q−1∑
i=0
|i〉|hN (i)〉.
If the conditions of Lemma 12 are satisfied, then |ψ〉 will be created correctly with a probability ph.
Then by Lemma 14, measuring the second register of the state results in a periodic state |ψ〉k,NR
with probability ≥ 1/2, where p ∈ {⌊q/S⌋ − 1, ⌊q/S⌋, ⌊q/S⌋ + 1}. Algorithm 1 returns L, a list of
candidates for S, which contains an element Sˆ which satisfies |S − Sˆ| ≤ 1. The probability of this
event is
Pr(|S − Sˆ| ≤ 1) ≥ p2hp2periodicpsuccess , (46)
where psuccess is defined in equation (32). The factor of p
2
hp
2
periodic is due to the fact that the
Algorithm 1 needs to create a pair of the pseudo-periodic states.
Assume that |S − Sˆ| ≤ 1 is present (of course, we do not know this). This is equivalent to
|R − R′| ≤ 1/N , where R′ = Sˆ/N . We actually check for a slightly weaker condition namely,
|(R −R′) mod R| ≤ 1/N . But this suffices.
Recall that we always choose N ≥ ⌈2/dmin⌉. This implies that either h(R′) = (x0, f) with f ≤ 1N
or h(R′) = (bs−1(x0), g) with g ≥ ∆bs(bs−1(x0))− 1/N . If we evaluate h˜, the approximate version
of h, at R′ with precision δprec ≤ 12N , then it remains the case that we can only obtain either (x0, f˜)
or (bs−1(x0), g˜). If so we can conclude that |R−R′ mod R| ≤ 1/N .
Now assume that |(R − R′) mod R| > 1/N holds. In this case, we may or may not encounter
bs−1(x0) or x0 by evaluating h˜ at R
′.
Because our test actually checked for |(R − R′) mod R| ≤ 1/N , we could have some spurious
solutions when R′ is a multiple of R. If this is the case, then we return the smallest such R′ as
satisfying |R−R′| ≤ 1/N . We then obtain an estimate for R as follows.
Once we have encountered bs−1(x0) or x0, we can compute h˜(R
′) with precision δ/2. If we obtain
(bs−1(x0), g˜), then we set
Rˆ = R′ − g˜ +∆bs(bs−1(x0)) , (47)
where we compute the distance ∆bs with precision δ/2. If we obtain (x0, f˜), then we set Rˆ = R
′− f˜ .
All these computations can be carried out in poly(log(R), log(1/δ) time.
The expected number of times we have to invoke the quantum algorithm to encounter bs−1(x0) or
x0 is clearly at most 1/qsuccess.
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There is a subtle point worth spelling out. In each run of the algorithm, there are two evaluations of
hN . We assume that the same random shift is used in both these evaluations and in any subsequent
O(1/qsuccess) runs. Only if the algorithm fails in all these runs do we change the offset and repeat
the process.
Finally, it can be easily verified for sufficiently large S, say S ≥ 256, the lower bound on the success
probability is greater than a constant, irrespective of the size of the problem.
The proposed algorithm when specialized to number fields improves upon [13] in the following as-
pects. The probability of success of the proposed algorithm is lower bounded by equation (32) which
is a constant 10−5 as opposed to [13] for which the success probability decreases as Ω(1/ log4(M)),
where M ≥ NR and is lower than 10−9, see [13, Claim 3.5 and Lemma 3.4] therein. As the expres-
sion indicates the success probability of the algorithm decreases with increasing circumference and
the performance gap with respect to our algorithm increases. Our lower bound is better than the
lower bound of [19], namely 2−26. Our result also implies fewer repetitions to boost the probability
of success, thereby lowering the complexity of the algorithm. In addition, the proposed algorithm
requires a smaller Quantum Fourier transform, thereby lowering the number of qubits and circuit
complexity.
5 Quantum algorithm for solving the generalized discrete loga-
rithm problem in infrastructures
In this section we give a quantum algorithm for the discrete logarithm problem. Given an element
x of an infrastructure I = (X, d) we are required to find the distance of x, namely d(x).
The function that is of interest in the computation of the discrete log problem is given by g(a, b) :
Z× R → I × R where g(a, r) = a · (x, 0) + h(r). By Lemma 9 we can compute g˜ the approximate
version of g, so that it satisfies properties P1, and P2.
As in the circumference case, we evaluate g˜ at carefully selected points to ensure that the first
component is always correct and quantize the second component. This resulting function is
gN (a, b) : Z× Z → I × Z
gN (a, b) =
(
y˜,
⌊
f˜N
⌋)
, (48)
where g˜(a, b/N + j/L) = (y˜, f˜).
The first component of gN is correct provided that equation (14) is satisfied for all evaluation points
of gN , i.e., none of the evaluation points are closer than 1/L to any element of the infrastructure.
As in the case of hN , we achieve this with high probability by applying a random shift of the form
j/L. The following lemma shows how to find a suitable L.
Lemma 16 (Offset for DLOG). Suppose I is an infrastructure that satisfies the assumptions A1-7.
Let A ⊆ {0, 1, . . . , A− 1} and B ⊆ {0, 1, . . . , ⌊RN⌋ − 1}. Let
L ≥
⌈
2Ak¯
(1− pg)
⌈
1
dk¯
(
R− 1
N
)⌉⌉
N. (49)
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Let j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , L/N − 1} be chosen uniformly at random. Then, the probability that∣∣∣∣(adx + bN + jL − dy) mod R
∣∣∣∣ ≥ 1L (50)
holds for all (a, b) ∈ A× B and all y ∈ X is greater or equal to pg.
Proof. Consider a fixed a ∈ A, then all the points adx + b/N + j/L are contained in the interval
[adx + j/L, adx + (⌊RN − 1⌋)/N + j/L]. This interval contains at most k¯⌈(R− 1/N)/dk¯⌉ elements
y ∈ X since its length is ⌊RN − 1⌋/N ≤ (R − 1/N). Observe that no y ∈ X can be closer than
1/L to any evaluation point of the above form for more than two offsets.
Hence, if we consider all a ∈ A, then at most 2Ak¯⌈(R− 1/N)/dk¯⌉ offsets are bad. Assuming L as
stated above, this implies that the probability that there is at least one element and at least one
evaluation point that are closer than 1/L to each other is at most (2Ak¯(R − 1/N)/dk¯)/(L/N) ≤
1− pg.
We always compute Rˆ with sufficiently high precision so that |Rˆ − R| < 1/(2N) holds. Then, we
have Rˆ > R− 1/2N and a suitable choice for L would be
⌈
2Ak¯
⌈
Rˆ/dk¯
⌉
/(1− pg)
⌉
N .
In the quantum algorithm for approximating the circumference, we encounter superpositions of the
form:
|ψ〉 = 1√|Ax,m|
∑
a∈Ax,m
|a〉|(x,m)〉,
where Ax,m has the special form {⌊k + jRN⌉ : j = 0, . . . , p} and (x,m) is equal to hN (k).
A somewhat similar type of quantum state appears in the discrete logarithm problem. A major
difference is that it involves a function of two variables
|ψ〉 = 1√|Ay,ℓ|
∑
(a,b)∈J
|a〉|b〉|(y, ℓ)〉,
where Ay,ℓ is now the fiber over (y, ℓ) ∈ im gN , i.e., gN (a, b) = (y, ℓ) for (a, b) ∈ Ay,ℓ.
The intuition based on Lemma 6, which characterizes the kernel of the perfect function g, suggests
that the elements in Ay,ℓ lie “close” to a line whose slope encodes the distance of the element x.
This statement is proved in Lemma 17, which establishes the exact relation between a and b for
gN . Lemma 18, establishes upper and lower bounds on the size of the preimage of (y, ℓ).
The intuition based on the quantum algorithm for the discrete logarithm problem in finite cyclic
groups suggests that we can extract the slope by Fourier sampling. This statement is proved in
Theorem 19.
Lemma 17. Let ∅ 6= A ⊆ {0, 1, . . . , A−1} where A is a positive integer and B ⊆ {0, 1, . . . , ⌊RN⌋−
1}. Denote by gN (A× B) the image of the function gN , i.e.,
gN (A× B) = {gN (a, b) : a ∈ A , b ∈ B} . (51)
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For each (y, ℓ) ∈ gN (A× B), the preimage g−1N (y, ℓ) has the form
g−1N (y, ℓ) = {(a, ba) : a ∈ Ay,ℓ} , (52)
where Ay,ℓ ⊆ A and assuming that a random shift of j/L has been applied to the evaluation points,
the values ba satisfy the condition⌊
adx +
ba
N +
j
L
R
⌋
R+ dy + γa +
ℓ
N
= adx +
ba
N
+
j
L
(53)
with 1/L ≤ γa ≤ 1/N − 1/L. The cardinality of the image satisfies the inequalities
|B| ≤ |gN (A× B)| ≤ ⌊R(N + 1/dmin)⌋ . (54)
Proof. Let (y, ℓ) ∈ gN (A× B) be arbitrary. Suppose that (a, ba) ∈ g−1N (y, ℓ). Then we must have
dy +
ℓ
N
+ γa ≡ adx + ba
N
+
j
L
mod R
= adx +
ba
N
+
j
L
−
⌊
adx +
ba
N +
j
L
R
⌋
R,
where 1/L ≤ γa ≤ 1/N − 1/L. This constraint on γa is due to the fact that none of the sampling
points are within a distance of less than 1/L from the elements of the infrastructure.
The second component ℓ is bounded from above by
ℓ ≤ N∆bs(y)
since the inequality⌊
adx +
ba
N +
j
L
R
⌋
R+ dy + γa +
ℓ
N
<
⌊
adx +
ba
N +
j
L
R
⌋
R+ dy +∆bs(y)
holds for all (a, ba) with gN (a, ba) = (y, ℓ). This implies that the number of images whose first
component is equal to y is at most N∆bs(y) + 1. Summing over all elements of the infrastructure
yields the upper boundRN+R/dmin. We can improve this to ⌊R(N + 1/dmin)⌋ since the cardinality
of gN (A× B) is an integer. Hence, |gN (A×B)| ≤ ⌊R(N + 1/dmin)⌋.
A condition similar to equation (54) has been established in [13] for the principal ideal problem. The
condition as derived in [13] may not be satisfied for some infrastructures. Therefore, we relax this
constraint and clarify certain crucial assumptions on the size of the preimage in Lemma 18.
Lemma 18. Let A and B be as in Lemma 17. Consider the probability distribution p = (py,ℓ) on
gN (A× B) where the probabilities of the elementary events (y, ℓ) are given by
py,ℓ =
|g−1N (y, ℓ)|
|A||B| . (55)
Let X be the random variable that takes on the value |g−1N (y, ℓ)| if the event (y, ℓ) occurs. Then, we
have
Pr
(
X ≥ κ|A|) ≥ 1
1− κ
( |B|
⌊R(N + 1/dmin)⌋ − κ
)
(56)
for any κ ∈ (0, 1).
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Proof. The expected value E[X] is bounded from below by
E[X] =
∑
(y,ℓ)
py,ℓ |g−1N (y, ℓ)|
= |A||B|
∑
(y,ℓ)
p2y,ℓ
≥ |A||B| 1|gN (A× B)|
≥ |A||B| 1⌊R(N + 1/dmin)⌋ .
We used that the sum
∑
p2y,ℓ is minimized when probability distribution is uniform on gN (A×B)
and |gN (A× B)| ≤ ⌊R(N + 1/dmin)⌋.
Let t = Pr(X ≥ κE[X]). Then, we must have
t|A|+ (1− t)κ|A| ≥ E[X] ≥ |A| |B|/⌊R(N + 1/dmin)⌋
since X is bounded by |A| from above. The desired lower bound on t follows now easily.
Theorem 19. Let I be an infrastructure containing at least 3 elements and satisfying the axioms
A1–A7. For all x ∈ X, Algorithm 2 returns an integer dˆx such that |dx − dˆx| ≤ 1, where dx is the
distance of x.
Let pg be the probability of correctly evaluating gN and κ a real number with (1 − sinc(3/4))/(1 −
2 sin(π/32)) < κ < 1 − 2/(2q + 1). Then, the success probability of the algorithm is Ω(1) and at
least
pgmax
κ
(
1− 2
(2q + 1)(1 − κ)
)2 κ2
2
(
1− 2 sin( π
32
)− (1− sinc(3/4))
κ
)4( 1
64
− 2
B
)2
(57)
where B =
⌊
RˆN
⌉
and q is chosen as in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Generalized discrete logarithm.
1: Choose M ≥ ⌈2R + 1⌉.
2: Determine Rˆ and N such that
∣∣∣M ⌊RˆN⌉−MRN ∣∣∣ ≤ 1/2 and N = q⌈2/dmin⌉ for a positive
integer with q ≤ 4M . Set B =
⌊
RˆN
⌉
and A =MB.
3: Choose L =
⌈
2Ak¯
⌈
Rˆ/dk¯
⌉
/(1− pg)
⌉
N .
4: Evaluate gN in superposition over {0, 1 . . . , A− 1} × {0, 1, . . . , B − 2} twice.
5: Fourier sample over ZA × ZB to obtain (h1, k1) and (h2, k2).
6: Find integers s, t such that sk1 + tk2 = 1, using the extended Euclidean algorithm.
7: Compute r = sh1+th2NM
8: Return dˆx = r −
⌊
r/Rˆ
⌋
Rˆ.
27
Proof. We compute an estimate Rˆ such that
|R− Rˆ| ≤ ǫ ≤ 1
16M2⌈2/dmin⌉ . (58)
We now show that there is an efficient method that determines positive integers B =
⌊
RˆN
⌉
and
N such that
|MB −MNR| ≤ 1
2
. (59)
To do this, we bound this deviation by
|MB −MNR| = |M⌊NRˆ⌉ −MNRˆ+MNRˆ−MNR| (60)
≤ |M⌊NRˆ⌉ −MNRˆ|+MNǫ (61)
The efficient method in Lemma 21 gives us a convergent p/q with q ≤ 4M such that∣∣∣∣pq − Rˆ⌈2/dmin⌉
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 14Mq . (62)
The numerator p has the form
⌊
Rˆ⌈2/dmin⌉q
⌉
. The bound in equation (62) and the form of the nu-
merator directly imply that N = q⌈2/dmin⌉ has the desired properties. Both terms in equation (61)
are smaller than 1/4 for this choice.
Observe that B−2 =
⌊
RˆN
⌉
−2 ≤ ⌊RN⌋−1 because Rˆ has been computed with such high precision.
We define the sets B = {0, 1, . . . , B − 2} and A = {0, 1, . . . , A− 1}.
We create the superposition
1√|A||B|
∑
a∈A
∑
b∈B
|a〉|b〉|gN (a, b)〉 .
We know that with probability greater or equal to pg all the values gN (a, b) are correct.
We measure the third register. Denote the outcome by (y, ℓ). Lemma 18 guarantees that |Ay,ℓ| ≥
κ|A| holds with probability greater or equal to
pκ ≥ 1
1− κ
( |B|
⌊R(N + 1/dmin)⌋ − κ
)
. (63)
Since N = q⌈2/dmin⌉, we can bound pκ
pκ ≥ 1
1− κ
(
NR− 3
NR(1 + 1/2q)
− κ
)
, (64)
≥ 1
1− κ
(
2q − 1
2q + 1
− κ
)
= 1− 2
(2q + 1)(1 − κ) , (65)
where we used the assumption that I has at least 3 elements and therefore R > 3dmin, andNR > 6q.
Lemma 17 implies that the post-measurement state has the form
1√|Ay,ℓ|
∑
a∈Ay,ℓ
|a〉|ba〉 (66)
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and there exists a unique ba for each a ∈ Ay,ℓ such that
ba = −adxN +
⌊
adx +
ba
N +
j
L
R
⌋
RN + dyN + γaN + ℓ− jN
L
, (67)
where 1/L ≤ γa ≤ 1/N − 1/L. We rewrite the condition on ba as
ba = −adxN +
⌊
adx +
ba
N +
j
L
R
⌋
RN + γaN +∆ , (68)
where ∆ = dyN + ℓ− jN/L is constant.
We apply the quantum Fourier transform over ZA×ZB to the first registers and obtain the super-
position
1√
A
1√
B
∑
h∈A
B−1∑
k=0
1√|Ay,ℓ|
∑
a∈Ay,ℓ
ωah+MbkA |h〉|k〉 . (69)
The amplitude of the term |h〉|k〉 is given by
1√
A
1√
B
1√|Ay,ℓ|
∑
a∈Ay,ℓ
ωah+MbakA . (70)
The exponent of ωA in the previous equation is
ah+Mk
(
−adxN +
⌊
adx + γa +
ba
N + j/L
R
⌋
NR+ γaN +∆
)
. (71)
The term Mk∆ is independent of a and can be dropped from the exponent since it does not change
the probability distribution.
We now show that we obtain a sample (h, k) such that
h = kdxMN −
⌊
kdx
R
⌋
MNR+ ǫh with |ǫh| ≤ 12 (72)
holds with high probability.5
As shown previously, N is chosen such that MNR −M
⌊
NRˆ
⌉
= η with |η| ≤ 12 . To simplify the
notation, we use x to denote the distance dx of the element x throughout the rest of the proof. The
5The reason that we consider samples that have this particular form is as follows. Rearranging the terms in the
exponent we see that the sum is dominated by the terms ah− (kdx/R)MNR + k⌊(adx + γa + ba/Nj/L)/R⌋MNR.
The exponent can be approximated as ah− (kdx/R − ⌊adx/R⌋)MNR. Therefore, the probability of (h, k) which is
determined by the geometric sum
1
ABAy,ℓ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
a∈Ay,ℓ
ωah+Mbak
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
≈
1
ABAy,ℓ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
a∈Ay,ℓ
ωa(h−(
kdx
R
−⌊ kdxR ⌋)MNR
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
is large when h = (kdx/R − ⌊kdx/R⌋)MNR + ǫh, where ǫh is to ensure that h is an integer.
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exponent of ωA modulo A is
a
(
kxMN −
⌊
kx
R
⌋
MNR+ ǫh
)
+Mk
(
−axN +
⌊
ax+ γa +
ba
N + j/L
R
⌋
NR+ γaN
)
=
(
k
⌈
ax+ γa +
ba
N + j/L
R
⌉
− a
⌊
kx
R
⌋)
MNR+ ǫha+MNγak
≡ η
(
k
⌈
ax+ γa +
ba
N + j/L
R
⌉
− a
⌊
kx
R
⌋)
+ ǫha+MNγak
= η
(
k
(ax
R
+ δa
)
− a
(
kx
R
+ ζ
))
+ ǫha+Mkγa
= ηδak − ηζa+ ǫha+MNγak
= δa+ θa . (73)
The (constant) factor δ := ǫh − ηζ in front of a is less than 3/4 in absolute value (ǫh ≤ 12 , ζ < 1
and η < 12). Assume we measure k ≤ ⌊B/64⌋− 1. Then, for each a the term θa := (ηδa +MNγa)k
is less than A/32 in absolute value (since |δa| < 2 and |γaN | < 1).
We can now apply Lemma 10 to bound the probability of measuring (h, k) as in equation (72); we
denote this probability by phk. Note that A corresponds to n, the summation index a to j and Ay,ℓ
to the set J in the Lemma 10.
The probability phk is bounded from below by
phk ≥ |Ay,ℓ|
AB
(
1− 2 sin(π/32) −
(
1− sinc(3/4)
) 1
κ
)2
, (74)
where cδ is as in Lemma 10.
The probability of any good pair (h, k) (with the restriction k ≤ ⌊B/64⌋−1) is bounded from below
by
κ
(
1− 2 sin(π/32) −
(
1− sinc(3/4)
) 1
κ
)2( 1
64
− 2
B
)
, (75)
where we used that |Ay,ℓ| ≥ κ|A| and ⌊B/64− 1⌋ ≥ B/64− 2.
We now show how to obtain an estimate of the distance of x from two good pairs (h1, k1) and
(h2, k2) with the additional restriction that k1, k2 are coprime. This is based on the method in [13].
We have hi = kixNM − ⌊kix/R⌋RNM + ǫi with |ǫi| ≤ 12 . Since k1, k2 are coprime we know there
exist integers s, t such that sk1 + tk2 = 1, which can be computed by the extended Euclidean
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algorithm. Let r = (sh1 + th2)/MN , then we have
sh1 + th2
MN
= sk1x− s
⌊
k1x
R
⌋
R+
sǫ1
MN
+ tk2x− t
⌊
k2x
R
⌋
R+
tǫ2
MN
= (sk1 + tk2)x− s
⌊
k1x
R
⌋
R− t
⌊
k2x
R
⌋
R+
sǫ1 + tǫ2
MN
= x− s
⌊
k1x
R
⌋
R− t
⌊
k2x
R
⌋
R+
sǫ1 + tǫ2
MN
= x−mR+ ǫr,
where ǫr = (sǫ1 + tǫ2)/MN . Since |s|, |t| ≤ max{k1, k2}, and k1, k2 ≤
[
RˆN
]
/32, it follows
that ǫr =
sǫ1+tǫ2
MN ≤ ⌊RN⌋MN < 1/2 by our choice of M . Furthermore, |m| ≤ NR/8, as |r| ≤
2M [NRˆ][NRˆ]/32MN < NR2/8.
We can estimate x by reducing r modulo Rˆ to bring it within the range [0, Rˆ). This gives us an
estimate xˆ = x−m(R− Rˆ) + ǫr and the error |x− xˆ| can be bounded as follows:
|x− xˆ| ≤ |m(R− Rˆ)|+ ǫr ≤ |mǫ|+ |ǫr|
≤ NR
8
1
16M2⌈2/dmin⌉ + |ǫr| ≤ 1,
where we used the fact that M > 2R and N ≤ 4M⌈2/dmin⌉ and |ǫr| < 1/2.
The probability of measuring two good samples (h1, k1) and (h2, k2) such that k1, k2 are coprime
is given by
psuccess ≥ 1
2
(pκphk(1/64 − 2/B))2pg, (76)
where pg is the probability of evaluating gN successfully.
We make the following observations regarding the success probability of the quantum algorithm.
First, a simpler lower bound on the success probability can be obtained without having to maximize
over κ in equation (57), by evaluating this expression at κ = (κ1+ κ2)/2, where κ1 = (1− cδ)/(1−
2 sin(π/32)) and κ2 = 1− 2/(2q + 1). We also note the expression can be further simplified to be
completely independent of of the size of the infrastructure as follows.
Second, under the assumption that R ≥ 256 and q ≥ 8, we can bound (1/64 − 2/B) ≥ 1/128 and
2/(2q + 1) ≤ 1/8, and the lower bound on success probability simplifies to a constant independent
of the problem size.
max
κ
pg
(
1− 1
8(1− κ)
)2 κ2
2
(
1− 2 sin( π
32
)− (1− sinc(3/4))
κ
)4( 1
128
)2
(77)
Although the expressions for the success probability may appear to be a little unwieldy, we hope
they provide insight into the various factors affecting the success probability.
Third, we can boost the success probability (strictly speaking, the lower bound on it) by increasing
q.
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Fourth, we can truly improve upon the success probability by extending the set of usable obser-
vations (h1, k1) and (h2, k2). Currently, we require that ki < ⌊B/64⌋, but this can be relaxed
significantly.
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Appendix
We prove here some auxiliary results.
Lemma 20. Let a and b be two random numbers chosen uniformly at random from {1, . . . , N}.
The probability that a and b are coprime is bounded from below by 1/2, i.e.,
Pr(gcd(a, b) = 1) >
1
2
. (78)
Proof. Let p be an arbitrary prime. Then the probability that p divides a, denoted Pr(p | a), is
given by
Pr(p | a) =
⌊Np ⌋
N
≤ 1
p
.
Thus,
Pr(p | gcd(a, b)) ≤ 1
p2
.
We obtain an upper bound on the probability that there is a prime dividing the greatest common
divisor of a and b with the help of the union bound. This yields
Pr(gcd(a, b) > 1) ≤
∑
p
1
p2
,
where the summation index p ranges over all primes. The sum of squared reciprocals of primes is
known to be ∑
p
1
p2
=
∞∑
k=1
µ(k)
k
ln ζ(2k) = 0.4522474200 . . . ,
where µ denotes the Mo¨bius mu function and ζ the Riemann zeta function [4, page 95]. Finally,
we obtain the desired result
Pr(gcd(a, b) = 1) ≥ 1−
∑
p
1
p2
>
1
2
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by considering the complementary event.
We now prove a result related to continued fractions. The reader can find more details about
continued fractions in [3].
Lemma 21. Let pi/qi denote the convergents of a real number r ∈ R, for i ∈ N. Then for any
given constant c > 1, there exists a convergent pℓ/qℓ such that |r − pℓ/qℓ| < 1/cqℓ and qℓ ≤ c.
Proof. Since c > 1 = q0 and qi form a monotonically increasing sequence for i > 1, there exists such
a convergent pℓ/qℓ such that qℓ ≤ c < qℓ+1 unless r has a finite continued fraction expansion with
all the qi < c. If the latter case occurs, then it follows that there exists a convergent pℓ/qℓ such
that r = pℓ/qℓ therefore for this convergent |r − p/q| = 0 < 1/c and the statement of the lemma
holds. Otherwise, r has a continued fraction expansion such that qℓ ≤ c < qℓ+1. We know that the
convergents satisfy the relation ∣∣∣∣r − piqi
∣∣∣∣ < 1qiqi+1 .
Therefore, we must have ∣∣∣∣r − pℓqℓ
∣∣∣∣ < 1qℓqℓ+1 < 1cqℓ ,
where we used the fact that qℓ+1 > c.
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